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Technical Note: Company Risk-related Disclosures in a Code Law Country: A 
Synopsis 
Abstract 
This synopsis provides a concise historical contextualisation of current risk disclosure issues, highlights 
major factors influencing contemporary risk reporting practices, and engages in a reflective overview of 
four recently published papers on aspects of corporate risk-related disclosures in a code law country, 
Portugal. The breadth and depth of our analysis is modest. Nonetheless we report findings indicating that 
risk-related disclosures are inadequate, lack transparency, and compound the difficulty of assessing the 
risk profile of a company. We contend that recent regulation initiatives have been of dubious 
effectiveness in improving the quality of risk information disclosed. In respect of the Portuguese context, 
we find that companies disclose risk-related information principally to reduce agency costs and to 
enhance corporate reputation. We contend that enhanced corporate accountability would be more likely 
to ensue if further disclosures of relevant risk-related information were mandated. One mechanism to do 
so would be through regulations recommended by the International Integrated Reporting Committee 
(IIRC). 
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This synopsis provides a concise historical contextualisation of current risk disclosure issues, 
highlights major factors influencing contemporary risk reporting practices, and engages in a 
reflective overview of four recently published papers on aspects of corporate risk-related 
disclosures in a code law country, Portugal. The breadth and depth of our analysis is modest. 
Nonetheless we report findings indicating that risk-related disclosures are inadequate, lack 
transparency, and compound the difficulty of assessing the risk profile of a company. We 
contend that recent regulation initiatives have been of dubious effectiveness in improving the 
quality of risk information disclosed. In respect of the Portuguese context, we find that 
companies disclose risk-related information principally to reduce agency costs and to 
enhance corporate reputation. We contend that enhanced corporate accountability would be 
more likely to ensue if further disclosures of relevant risk-related information were mandated. 
One mechanism to do so would be through regulations recommended by the International 
Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC). 
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How and why companies use disclosures in annual reports to communicate their exposure to 
risk, and their risk management practices, is a matter of considerable public interest. Despite 
growing attention to risk issues following recent major unexpected corporate collapses (e.g. 
Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, Barings Bank) and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008/09, the 
factors explaining companies’ risk-related disclosures (RRD), and the levels and patterns of 
their RRD, are not well known. Transparent RRD should be an important corporate 
governance objective.  
This synopsis provides a reflective overview of four recently published papers on 
aspects of corporate RRD – all using Portugal as an empirical setting. Such a setting seems to 
be warranted and timely given widespread concerns about the affect of risk-related economic 
behaviors by governments and companies in European Latin countries (such as Portugal, 
Spain, Italy and France) on global economic stability. This synopsis also provides a concise 
historical overview of current risk disclosure issues and reports some of the important factors 
that have influenced levels and patterns of RRD. The findings reported are instructive 
because most existing research focuses on RRD practices in Anglo-American countries. The 
insights obtained will help develop better understanding of the economic, social and 
regulatory context of Portugal – and perhaps (even if only slightly) provide insights into why 
Portugal is implicated in concerns about global financial stability.  
Anglo-American countries have a common law focus. Financial reporting principally 
seeks transparency and full disclosure. Listed public companies tend to be owned widely. 
Stock markets are well developed and are the main source of financing. Financial reporting 
emphasises shareholder rights and investors’ interests. Financial disclosure is viewed as a 
way of reducing information asymmetry between managers and investors. High levels of 
RRD are expected.  
In contrast, Latin countries (such as Portugal, Spain, and Italy) operate under a code 
law system that is oriented toward legal compliance. Such countries are characterised by low 
levels of disclosure. This is largely because listed companies are usually family-based and a 
have a high concentration of family ownership. As a consequence, “insider communication 
solves the information asymmetry between managers and shareholders” (Ball, Kothari & 
Robin 2000, p3). Stock markets are small. The government and banks are the primary source 
of financing. Financial reporting focuses on creditor protection (Lopes & Rodrigues 2007). 
Consequently, in comparison with practice in Anglo-American countries, different levels and 
patterns of RRD should be expected.  
Agency theorists contend that disclosure of risk information is motivated by a desire 
to reduce information asymmetries between shareholders and managers; and that disclosure 
of risk information will reduce agency costs (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Monitoring 
mechanisms, such as ownership structure, board independence, audit committee 
independence, leadership duality and the quality of external auditors, promote higher levels 
of information disclosure (Linsley & Shrives 2005). However, no single theory provides a 
complete explanation for why companies make RRD. The four studies we discuss later find 
also that incentives for RRD can be explained by legitimacy theory and a resource-based 
perspective.  
We begin with a brief and concise historical contextualisation of current risk 
disclosure issues. We then provide a brief synopsis of each of the four empirical studies. We 
conclude with a reflective discussion that draws attention to the need for further mandated 
disclosures of risk-related information. 
 
 






Since the Industrial Revolution risk has assumed a strong presence in management thinking. 
Fayol (1949) recognised its importance when he advocated security as one of six functions of 
industrial activity. Security was conceived as the mitigation of potential risks and 
safeguarding of property and persons against threats, hazards and the endangerment of 
business progress. 
The concept of risk has evolved from initially only conceiving the negative dimension 
of risk (or downside risk) to also incorporating the positive dimension of risk (or the upside 
risk of embracing any future potential opportunities). Early definitions of risk restricted the 
notion to real world events that were connected to companies’ external environments. 
However, in the face of continually-evolving threats to business activity, there is now a 
broader view of risk. This broader view recognises the importance of implementing 
appropriate risk management systems within organisations to foresee threats and to help 
prevent possible financial distress (Gallati 2003).  
To control the systemic risk to which companies are exposed, and to help ensure 
adequate risk management, regulatory authorities have begun to force listed companies to 
develop their culture, infrastructure, and organisational processes relating to risk (as we 
explain below). Since the 1990s there has been a concerted endeavour to regulate risk 
reporting and to implement risk management systems.  
In 1992 in the USA the Report of the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO)4 (titled Internal Control: Integrated Framework, accessible at 
http://www.coso.org/IC-IntegratedFramework-summary.htm) established guidelines for the 
design, assessment and improvement of internal control systems. This report aimed to help 
identify and prevent fraudulent financial reporting. The COSO report regarded internal 
controls as embracing control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information 
and communication, and monitoring. The presence of these five elements was thought likely 
to provide reasonable assurance that a company would achieve effective and efficient 
operations, report reliable financial information, and comply with laws and regulations 
(Woods 2008). 
There was only a limited adoption of the COSO Integrated Framework by US 
companies until 2002. In that year, the Sarbanes Oxley Act [SOX], in effect, recommended 
the application of the COSO guidelines as a suitable regulatory response to the [then recent] 
financial scandals involving Worldcom and Enron. This recommendation was intended to 
improve the reliability of financial reporting. It was predicated on the idea that good internal 
controls would assure reliability. Section 404 of SOX required each company annual report to 
contain an internal control report in which management assessed the effectiveness of their 
company’s internal control system. However, the increased cost of compliance with this 
requirement (which shifted most Initial Public Offerings from the US to the UK) prompted 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2006 to publish Management’s Report 
on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act 
Periodic Reports (accessible at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/33-8762.pdf), in 
which it changed its position in relation to COSO. The SEC recognised that the 1992 COSO 
Integrated Framework did not set forth a suitable approach for management to follow in 
evaluating the effectiveness of a company’s internal controls over financial reporting (Woods 
2008). 
In the UK, risk management issues became prominent from about 1992 with the 
Cadbury Report on accountability and risk management aspects of corporate governance 
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(Demirag, Sudarsanam & Wright 2000). However, the Cadbury Report neglected important 
disclosure matters (for example, of internal controls and risk management practices). In 1999 
the London Stock Exchange issued Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined 
Code, also known as the Turnbull Report (accessible at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=129). This recommended the inclusion of an 
appropriate report to shareholders about the evaluation conducted by a company of its 
internal control system. However, the Turnbull Report did not require that specific risks be 
explained to help stakeholders properly assess the risk position of a company. 
The revisions to the UK Corporate Governance Code in 2010 added a new principle: 
“the board is responsible for determining the nature and the extent of the significant risks it is 
willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives” (Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
2010, p7). The Sharman Panel of Inquiry established by the FRC in 2011 to consider Going 
Concern and Liquidity Risks: Lessons for Companies and Auditors, recommended that the 
going concern assessment process focus on solvency risks as well as liquidity risks; identify 
any risks to an entity’s business model or capital adequacy that could threaten its survival; 
and include stress tests of liquidity and solvency. The new model was required to integrate 
going concern reporting with discussion by directors of strategy and principal risks (FRC 
2011). 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) published 
Financial Reporting of Risk: Proposals for a Statement of Business Risk in 1997 (ICAEW, 
1997). This proposed that listed companies voluntarily disclose information about business 
risk in a specific statement in their annual report. Companies were to adopt a full disclosure 
perspective in explaining their significant risk exposures and how those exposures were being 
dealt with. Risk reporting in this fashion was claimed to be likely to reduce the cost of 
capital, signal a company’s best level of risk management ability, encourage better risk 
management, and improve accountability. However, such disclosure did not fully recognise 
the commercial sensitivity of risk information. In two subsequent ICAEW publications (No 
Surprises: The Case for Better Risk Reporting in 1999; and No Surprises: Working for Better 
Risk Reporting in 2002) an opt-out clause was included to relieve companies of the 
obligation to disclose risk information. In 1988 the Basel I Accord (International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, accessible at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.htm) issued by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 
sought to reduce systemic risk of companies, enhance market discipline, and assure the 
stability of the financial system. The Accord established standards for calculating the capital 
adequacy of finance companies. In 1998, in Enhancing Bank Transparency (accessible at 
http://www.bis.org/list/bcbs/from_01011996/index.htm), the BIS proposed that banks should 
disclose information about their financial performance, financial position, risk management 
strategies, and risk exposures of all kinds (credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, operational 
risk and legal risk). In 2004, the BIS published a revised framework (International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework) known 
as the Basel II Accord (accessible at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm). This sought to 
reinforce minimum capital requirements, supervision arrangements, and market discipline. 
In 2009, influenced by events of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008/09, the Basel II 
requirements were revised and renamed the Basel III Accord. The revisions introduced higher 
capital requirements to compensate for the effects of the credit risks involved with complex 
trading activities, stressed Value-at-Risk (VaR) requirements as a means of reducing 
procyclicality, and reinforced disclosure requirements relating to securitisations and off-
balance sheet exposures. However, opt-out clauses continued to allow the non-reporting of 
risks that were regarded as too commercially sensitive or prejudicial. 




In the accounting profession, the International Accounting Standards Board issued 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosures) in 
2005 (accessible at http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/standard47). IFRS 7 required 
disclosures of the risks associated with financial instruments. Although companies are subject 
to financial and non-financial risks, the mandatory disclosure requirements of IFRS 7, even 
after its most recent amendment in 2011, focus only on financial risks (that is, credit risk, 
market risk, and liquidity risk).  
 
Four Studies of Risk-related Disclosure  
 
In Oliveira, Rodrigues & Craig (2011a) we proposed a theoretical framework that combined 
agency theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based perspectives to explain the motivations 
for RRD by Portuguese non-finance companies. A content analysis assessed the RRD 
practices in annual reports for 2005 of 81 Portuguese companies in the non-finance sector (42 
listed and 39 unlisted). 
We found that adoption of IFRS and the European Union’s Modernisation Directive 
in 2005 did not affect the quantity and quality of RRD positively. RRD were generic, 
qualitative and backward-looking. Public visibility (as assessed by a company’s size and its 
environmental sensitivity) was a crucial influence in explaining RRD. There was strong 
evidence that companies managed their reputation through disclosure of risk-related 
information. The level of RRD increased with higher levels of debt exposure (leverage), and 
with a greater presence of independent directors. 
In Oliveira, Rodrigues & Craig (2011b) we assessed the quality of RRD made by 190 
Portuguese Credit-granting Institutions (PCIs) by means of a content analysis of their 
individual annual reports for 2006. We explored the effectiveness of the reforms of RRD 
practices that were introduced in 2007 in IFRS and the Basel II Accord. A principal finding 
was that RRD lacked comparability because they used different maturity time bands to report 
exposures to credit, market and liquidity risks; different VaR and sensitivity analysis 
assumptions; and different practices for reporting capital structure and adequacy. 
In Oliveira, Rodrigues & Craig (2013) we analysed individual annual reports of 185 
PCIs for 2006 to understand why finance companies made RRD. We found that some 
particular characteristics of the banking sector were influential in motivating mandatory and 
voluntary RRD (e.g., consumer orientation, high levels of public visibility, multiple 
stakeholders, and intensive regulation). Because the results pointed to the inadequacies of 
shareholder theory in explaining RRD, we explored whether legitimacy theory and the 
adoption of a resources-based perspective explained RRD. We found that legitimacy and 
reputation factors were influential: managers of PCIs with high public visibility attributed 
greater importance to RRD than did managers of banks with lower public visibility.  
In Oliveira Rodrigues & Craig (2011c) we explored factors that affected voluntary 
RRD in the individual annual reports for 2006 of 111 Portuguese commercial banks. 
Voluntary operational risk, capital structure and adequacy disclosures were assessed using a 
list of disclosure categories developed from the Third Pillar disclosure requirements of the 
Basel II Accord. We found that stakeholder monitoring and corporation reputation were 
crucial factors explaining the risk reporting practices observed. Voluntary risk reporting 
appeared to enhance legitimacy by fulfilling institutional pressures to assure the effectiveness 
of market discipline; and by managing stakeholder perception of a corporation’s reputation. 










In general, the RRD practices observed in the four Portuguese studies were inadequate. They 
were vague, generic, qualitative and backward-looking. This lends support to the need for 
further regulatory initiatives to improve the disclosure of risk information. To date, most risk-
related regulations have tended to focus only on financial risks (e.g. IFRS 7) or have 
demanded vague and generic RRD (e.g. European Directives 2001/65/EC, 2003/51/EC, 
2004/109/EC, and 2006/46/EC). Companies should be encouraged to disclose more and 
better risk information, especially forward-looking RRD. Clearer explanations are needed too 
− of how risk is aligned with strategy, of how risk is managed, and how all varieties of risk 
are expected to affect the future performance of a company.  
RRD by Portuguese finance companies lacked transparency, making it difficult to 
assess the risk profile of a company. The adoption of risk-based regulation (e.g., IAS/IFRS 
and EU’s Modernisation Directive in 2005) had a positive effect on the quantity of RRD, but 
not the quality. The RRD practices of Portuguese non-finance companies were predominantly 
backward-looking and qualitative. RRD of highly publicly visible Portuguese commercial 
banks were usually made in annual reports in risk-specific sections of the management report 
and/or notes to financial statements. In Portuguese non-finance companies, RRD were 
scattered throughout the annual reports. 
RRD were motivated by more than a desire to resolve problems of information 
asymmetry. Managers were motivated to make RRD to avoid agency costs and to sustain 
competitive advantages. They used RRD as a communication strategy to enhance corporate 
reputation, consistent with legitimacy theory and resource-based perspectives. Public 
visibility and concerns about corporate reputation were crucial influences in explaining RRD 
as well.  
The presence of independent directors significantly improved the level of RRD by 
non-finance companies. Thus, corporate governance structure was an important factor in 
encouraging RRD. The apparent awareness of supervisory and regulatory entities to the 
failure of boards of directors (in particular of independent non-executive directors) to 
identify, understand and control risks has been manifest in two initiatives: first, the European 
Parliament and Council’s reinforcement of corporate governance structures (e.g. EU 
Directive 2006/46/EC); and second, the Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial 
Institutions and Remuneration Policies, published by the EU (accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/modern/corporate_governance_in_financial_ins
titutions_en.htm).  
Integrated reporting presents a possible facilitative way ahead, as the International 
Integrated Reporting Committee [IIRC] has noted: 
 
The recent global financial crisis has made it clear that risks can develop, be harboured and be 
transmitted through market participants and practices that fall outside the traditionally prudentially 
regulated institutions. One important tool in addressing these risks is greater transparency of market 
participants, which Integrated Reporting can facilitate (IIRC 2011, p23). 
 
Enhanced accountability would seem more likely if further disclosures of substantive 
and relevant risk-related information in company annual reports were mandated.  
How to elicit better accountability by companies of their exposure to risk and their 
management of risk is a challenging task. Empirical and theoretical understandings of the 
type elicited in the four studies synthesised here should be helpful in addressing that task.  
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